The opinion is Samson v. The LCF Group, Inc. (In re Bridger Steele, Inc.), Adv. No. 2:24-ap-2003 in the Montana Bankruptcy Court (decided September 30, 2024; Doc. 10).
Background
Debtor is a fabricator and seller of metal roofing and siding products.
Does a Chapter 7 debtor have appellate standing to protect the homestead exemption?
That’s an issue addressed (sort of) in Karamoussayan v Massachusetts Department of Revenue (In re Karamoussayan), Case No. 22-041, First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (decided April 11, 2024).
Chronology
Here’s a chronology.
September 9, 2022 — Debtor files a voluntary Chapter 13 petition
A new Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion[fn. 1] involves the motion of a federal inmate, who was also a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor, for compassionate-release under 18 U.S. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The new Seventh Circuit opinion denies the motion.
Notably, the bankruptcy Debtor/Inmate is serving a 30-year sentence for making false statements during a bankruptcy proceeding The bankruptcy statute is 18 U.S.C. § 152, which declares it is a crime when a person:
Executive Summary
“A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1192 [Subchapter V], 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not dischargean individual debtor from any debt— . . .”
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (emphasis added).
Bankruptcy courts applying the foregoing language in the early days of Subchapter V found such language to be clear and unambiguous: that only “an individual debtor” is affected.
Congress, the federal appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court all need to recognize this historical reality:
- bankruptcy is an efficient and effective tool for resolving mass tort cases, as demonstrated by cases with huge-majority approval votes from tort victims.
And all those institutions need to prevent anti-bankruptcy biases, legal technicalities, and hold-out groups from torpedoing the huge-majority votes.
Supreme Court moving in the right direction?
As a wise man is wont to say, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”
This statement applies with full force to the recent, related opinions from Judge Marvin Isgur of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, addressing the effects of a so-called “uptier” liability management transaction.1
Procedurally, Judge Isgur’s rulings denied in part and granted in part motions for summary judgment, permitting certain claims to proceed to trial beginning on January 25, 2024.
Judge Jacqueline P. Cox recently found that three Illinois attorneys violated their ethical obligations by failing to return their client’s phone calls. She thus ordered the attorneys to return half of their already-court-approved, and paid, flat fee.
In In re: Dennis Molnar, 19-bk-09525, 2024 WL 190919 (Jan. 17, 2024 N.D, Ill.), the debtor filed a petition seeking relief under chapter 13. Originally, three attorneys from the same firm represented the debtor. The attorneys appeared pursuant to a “no look,” flat-fee program for chapter 13 debtors’ attorneys.
Over the past several years, unitranche facilities have become increasingly prevalent. This growth has been driven by the ever-growing class of private credit and direct lenders who initially developed the unitranche facility structure, along with traditional bank lenders now joining this market. The unitranche structure has several advantages, including typically quicker execution for the parties involved and in some cases a lower cost of capital to the borrower.